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Abstract. In this paper, we study privacy models for privacy-preserving
Wifi fingerprint based indoor localization (PPIL) schemes. We show that
many existing models are insufficient and make unrealistic assumptions
regarding adversaries’ power. To cover the state-of-the-art practical at-
tacks, we propose the first formal security model which formulates the
security goals of both client-side and server-side privacy beyond the
curious-but-honest setting. In particular, our model considers various
malicious behaviors such as exposing secrets of principles, choosing ma-
licious Wifi fingerprints in location queries, and specifying the location
area of a target client. Furthermore, we formulate the client-side pri-
vacy in an indistinguishability manner where an adversary is required to
distinguish a client’s real location from a random one. The server-side
privacy requires that adversaries cannot generate a fabricate database
which provides a similar function to the real database of the server. In
particular, we formally define the similarity between databases with a
ball approach that has not been formalized before. We show the validity
and applicability of our model by applying it to analyze the security of
an existing PPIL protocol.
Keywords: Indoor localization ·Wifi fingerprint · Security Model · Pri-
vacy.
1 Introduction
People spend significant amounts of their time in public indoor environments
including shopping malls, libraries, airports, university campuses, etc. This has
boosted the interest towards various indoor location-based applications[15, 6]
such as indoor-navigation or elderly assistance and emergency responding. How-
ever, in an indoor environment, the traditional Global Positioning System (GPS)
may be not available due to weak signal strengths caused by blocking construc-
tions. To obtain a location in a building, a client has to rely on certain indoor
location services (ILS) provided by some server of the building. The most widely
used approach for ILS is the one based on the Wifi fingerprinting technique [18,
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11, 5, 20, 8, 9, 21, 14, 7]. This method is very effective and popular because it uses
an existing Wifi infrastructure of a building. For a Wifi fingerprint based ILS,
the server holds a geo-location database (e.g. [22, Table 1]) containing signal
strengths of Wifi access points (AP) in various reference locations, as explained
in Section 3. Roughly speaking, a client measures the signal strengths of Wifi
APs in the client’s current (unknown) location and send them to the server. The
server calculates the client’s location based on the geo-location database, e.g.,
by calculating the k-nearest Euclidean distances between the client’s input and
reference fingerprints in the database. Finally, the server sends the location to
the client. However, this naive solution cannot prevent a malicious server from
tracking its clients’ locations, which of course violates the clients’ privacy.
Recently, several solutions, e.g. [13, 12, 24, 22], have been proposed to protect
the clients’ location privacy in ILSs. However, only a few pieces of research (e.g.
[24]) have included a formal security model for privacy-preserving indoor local-
ization (PPIL) schemes. This deficiency has resulted in the development of flawed
protocols (e.g. [13, 24]) which may take years to discover. Therefore, applying
PPIL schemes without rigorous security proofs is inherently risky. For example,
in INFOCOM 2014, Li et al. [13] presented a Wifi fingerprint localization system
called PriWFL which was claimed to provide both clients’ location privacy and
server’s database privacy (which will be referred to as client-privacy and server-
privacy for short, respectively). PriWFL is based on the ‘honest-but-curious’
setting where the adversary does not change the protocol execution between
an honest client and the server. Client-privacy roughly states that no passive
adversary (including the server) can infer the honest client’s location after in-
tercepting all protocol messages. Server-privacy requires that a malicious client
cannot use location queries for compromising the server’s database. However,
Yang and Ja¨rvinen [22] recently unveiled a practical attack (which will be called
as chosen fingerprint attack) for breaking the server-privacy of PriWFL. In this
chosen fingerprint attack, the malicious client chooses special fingerprints, such
as all-zeros or single-one fingerprints, to compromise the whole server’s database.
Unfortunately, their attack idea can be applied to break also the protocol recently
proposed by [24], as shown in [23]. One of the major problems here is that the
server-privacy defined in [13, 24] cannot cover the malicious client attack of [22].
Hence, PriWFL has not been provably demonstrated to provide security against
such attack (due to lack of formal definitions). Namely, the curious-but-honest
setting is not enough for proving the security for PPIL schemes.
To fix the problem of PriWFL, Yang and Ja¨rvinen proposed a new PPIL
scheme (which will be referred to as YJ scheme) that relies on Paillier’s public
key encryption (PKE) [17] and garbled circuits based secure evaluation function
(SFE). Intuitively, the YJ scheme satisfies both client- and server-privacy. How-
ever, we notice that its security is only informally justified in [22] without being
analyzed under an appropriate security model. Hence, there are still open ques-
tions: (i) how many active attacks it can withstand and (ii) what the security
assumptions of its build blocks and the corresponding security reductions should
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be. The primary motivation for this work is to develop a formal security model
that allows formal analysis of the security of practical PPIL protocols.
We stress that the definitions on client- and server-privacy respectively are
fundamental to the success of ‘provably secure’ PPIL schemes. It is therefore
highly desirable to define a security model to cover the state-of-the-art attacks so
that their securities can be formally proved to satisfy the security goals. Recently,
Zhang et al. [24] made an effort to formulate the client- and server-privacyin a
curious-but-honest setting. The definitions of client- and server-privacy in [24]
can be seen as extensions from that in [13]. In the location privacy attack [24,
Definition 1], a successful adversary should compromise either a client’s Wifi
fingerprint or location in a query. However, in practice, an adversary may violate
client-privacy via learning (for instance) sensitive information about whether
the client appeared at some place or its whereabouts, even without knowing its
exact location or fingerprints. In particular, the definition of server-privacy is still
vague in [24]. I.e., ‘a certain level of accuracy’ (in [24, Definition 2]) regarding
ILS provided by an adversary is not clearly formalized. Specifically, there is
no way to measure the accuracy of an adversary’s ILS as there is no security
experiment or any formulation about the adversary’s advantage on breaking
either client- or server-privacy. Furthermore, several important practical attacks
are not modeled in [24]) such as: (i) chosen fingerprint attack introduced by
Yang and Ja¨rvinen [22], (ii) known location attack (e.g. whether knowledge of an
exposed (historical) location of a client affects the client’s unexposed locations),
and (iii) known sub-area attacks (e.g. a follower is curious about the direction
of movement or location of a client within a specific area). It is still an open
question on modeling these malicious attacks. Hence, we conclude that Zhang et
al.’s model is rather weak and informal and it is not possible to give a thorough
security analysis for a PPIL protocol using such model.
Our results. In this paper, we present the first unilateral-malicious security
model for Wifi fingerprint-based PPIL schemes to solve the open problems in
existing models. Generally speaking, the unilateral-malicious setting is stronger
than the traditional semi-honest setting but weaker than the fully malicious set-
ting. In the unilateral-malicious setting, we particularly formulate the malicious
behaviors relative to clients’ sessions, e.g., manipulating Wifi fingerprints and
exposing locations. We require the server to behave in semi-honest manner (for
simplicity). Namely, the server may be curious about a client’s location, but it
should honestly run the protocol instance in order to provide a good service.
We can weaken the security requirement of the server since a server’s mali-
cious behaviors (e.g., dishonest executions) would be easily caught in practice
(and substantially punished) due to providing poor ILS. If the service is poor,
then clients would likely just stop using the service and, consequently, make
such an attack impossible. However, the server cannot easily identify a client’s
malicious behaviors. This is true especially when the client’s messages are (non-
deterministically) encrypted by its own public key. Hence, we define the first
practical formal PPIL security model that focuses on modeling the most harm-
ful malicious behaviors on the client side. We specifically apply our new security
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model to analyze the YJ scheme (as an example) to not only show the validity of
our security model but also to exhibit another attractiveness of the YJ scheme
in its provable security.
We consider the security model in a simulation environment (which covers
the real world applications) with a single server and multiple clients, where
each client may have multiple sessions for querying different locations. Unlike
previous work [13, 24, 22], we formulate the attacks of an adversary via a series
of oracle queries. Each query stands for a generic class of attacks. Under the
unilateral-malicious setting, we assume that the adversary can only run protocol
instances between the client and server by following the protocol specification.
In spite of that, several important active attacks are defined via a series of oracle
queries allowing an adversary to manipulate and learn sensitive information of
sessions. Namely, an adversary can specify sessions’ initial states such as Wifi
fingerprint and target location area, record her own RSS measurements, or reveal
a principal’s long-term or ephemeral secret key and a client’s location. The details
of these queries can be found in Section 3.
The security goal of client-privacy is defined in an indistinguishable manner
following the approach in [3]. Namely, a PPIL scheme is said to be client secure
(informally) if no polynomial time adversaries can distinguish the location of an
unexposed session from a random location. Whereas the security goal of server-
privacy is achieved (informally) if all polynomial time adversaries are unable to
generate a database D′ which can provide a similar function of the server’s real
database D. A key problem required to be resolved is to formulate the notion
of ‘similar function’. Here we adopt a ball approach. Informally speaking, we
say that the fabricated database D′ generated by an adversary has a similar
function to the real database D, if D′ results in a fabricated location L′ within
a small ball that is centered at the corresponding real location L (which is cal-
culated based on D for a certain location query) with a pre-defined radius ρ for
most of the distinct location queries. Furthermore, each security goal is asso-
ciated with a corresponding security experiment which defines the interactions
between adversary and experiment simulator (challenger), rules of the adversary
(on launching various attacks), and winning condition of the adversary. Even-
tually, we carefully define the client- and server- privacy in conjunction with
the adversarial model, security experiment, and the corresponding adversaries’
winning advantages. Here define a security model mainly for the Wifi fingerprint
database. However, our security definitions and the adversarial model might be
still generic enough to address the security for different kinds of PPIL schemes.
It is not hard to see that the key elements (or formulation ideas) of our security
model, such as adversary model, security experiment, and security definitions,
can be simply applied to formulate other types of databases with small changes.
In the security analysis of the YJ scheme, we first show that the client-privacy
can be linearly reduced to that of Paillier PKE and SFE. We also show that the
YJ scheme does not leak any useful information about a server’s database to
the adversaries due to the large enough randomness space, and the security of
SFE. Since adversaries cannot gain overwhelming advantages from the messages
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of YJ protocol, the security of the database is therefore determined by the secret
entropy of the database itself.
Organization. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
security assumptions on the building blocks of the YJ scheme are reviewed in
Section 2. In Section 3, we introduce a new security model for PPIL protocols.
In Section 4, we review the YJ scheme and introduce the security analysis under
our proposed model. Finally, we give conclusion remarks in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
General Notations. We let κ ∈ N be the security parameter and 1κ be a string
of κ ones. Let [n] = {1, . . . , n} ⊂ N denote the set of integers. Let a $← S denote
the operation sampling a uniform random element from a set S. We use ‖ to
denote the concatenation operation of two strings. Let | · | denote an operation
calculating the bit-length of a string, and # denote an operation calculating the
number of elements in a set.
Paillier Public Encryption Scheme. Paillier public-key encryption (PKE)
scheme [17] is a probabilistic encryption scheme. Let PrimG(κ) be a function
which generates a set of primes of length κ. The Paillier PKE scheme mainly
consists of the following three algorithms:
– Key Generation (KeyGen). Given the security parameter 1κ, the algorithm
chooses two large primes p, q
$← PrimG(κ/2), and computes n = p · q. It also
selects a group generator g for the multiplicative group Z∗n2 , such that the
order of g is a non-zero multiple of n. The public key pk is a tuple (n, g) and
the secret key sk is λ = lcm(p− 1, q − 1). This algorithm returns (pk, sk).
– Encryption (Enc). This algorithm takes a message m < n and a public
key (n, g) as inputs. It selects a random value r
$← [n], and computes the
ciphertext: C = gm · rn mod n2. The output of this algorithm is C. For
simplicity, we may omit modulus n2 in the rest of the paper.
– Decryption (Dec). This algorithm takes C < n2 and the secret key λ as
inputs, and outputs m = L(C
λ) mod n2
L(gλ) mod n2
mod n where L(u) = u−1n .
Paillier PKE scheme is additively homomorphic over the group Zn. Namely,
for two ciphertexts C1 = Enc(pk,m1) and C1 = Enc(pk,m2), we have that
Dec(sk, C1 · C2 mod n2) = m1 + m2 (mod n) and Dec(sk, C1 · C−12 mod n2) =
m1 −m2 (mod n), where the inverse can be computed via the exponentiation
C−12 = C
n2−1
2 mod n
2. Using the above homomorphic additions, it is also possi-
ble to compute multiplications and divisions by a scalar t ∈ [n]: Dec(sk, Ct1 mod
n2) = t ·m1 (mod n) and Dec(sk, Ct−1 mod n1 mod n2) = m1/t (mod n), where
t−1 mod n can be computed with the Extended Euclidean Algorithm.
We review the security of Paillier PKE scheme via the following definition.
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Definition 1. The security experiment for a Paillier PKE scheme Pai= (KeyGen,
Enc, Dec) is defined in the following:
EXPind-cpaPai,B (κ) :
b
$← {0, 1}, p, q $← PrimG(κ/2), n = p · q; g ← Z∗n2 ,
(m0,m1)← B(n, g), s.t. |m0| = |m1| and 0 ≤ (m0,m1) < n ;
r0, r1
$← [n− 1], C0 := gm0 · rn0 mod n2, C1 := gm1 · rn1 mod n2;
b′ ← B(pk, Cb); if b = b′ return 1, otherwise return 0.
We define the advantage of B in the above experiment as: Advind-cpaPai,B (κ) :=∣∣∣Pr[EXPind-cpaPai,B (κ) = 1]− 12 ∣∣∣ . We say that the Paillier PKE scheme Pai is se-
cure, if for all probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary B the advantage
Advind-cpaPai,B (κ) is a negligible function in κ.
Two-party Secure Function Evaluation. We briefly review the formal no-
tions regarding (circuit based) secure function evaluation (SFE) which is used
by the YJ protocol. Given a public function Fˆ , a classical SFE scheme allows
two parties to run a protocol which results in party 1 learning only the outcome
of Fˆ (x1||x2), while party 2 learning nothing, where x1 and x2 are the private
inputs of party 1 and party 2 respectively. We refer the reader to [2] for more
details on the security notions and concrete example of SFE.
We let fˆ denote a circuit for a certain function Fˆ with input size n ∈ N
(that may be accessed as fˆ .n). And let ev(fˆ , x) be a canonical circuit evaluation
function which takes as inputs fˆ and a string x, and computes the output of
the function Fˆ (x). Here we define a function Φ(fˆ) to describe what we allow
to be revealed regarding fˆ . With respect to a garbling scheme, Φ may reveal a
circuit’s size, topology, identity, or many others. More concrete side information
functions can be found in [2, 1].
In a two-party protocol, we suppose that party i (i ∈ [2]) has a private string
xi with length ni, and party 2 has a circuit fˆ where n = n1 + n2. We describe a
two-party protocol (for executing a SFE scheme) via a pair of PPT algorithms
Σ = (Σ1, Σ2) . Party i ∈ {1, 2} will run Σi on its current state and the incoming
message from its intended partner, to generate an outgoing message and a local
output. The initial state of Σi includes the security parameter κ, a fresh random
coin γi
$← Ri (chosen from a random space Ri) and the (private) function input
Ii of party i. The random coins γ1 and γ2 might be omitted (in the following
descriptions) for simplicity, i.e., they are implicitly generated and used. In order
to represent the protocol execution, we define a PPT algorithm ViewiΣ which
takes as input security parameter 1κ, and inputs (I1, I2) for the two parties
respectively, and returns an execution view vwi and output outi of party i in a
protocol instance. Nevertheless, we may denote an execution between two parties
as SF.Σ(I1, I2) at a high-level view.
Then a SFE scheme is a tuple SF = (Σ, ev) where Σ is a two-party pro-
tocol with input (I1, I2) as above and ev is a circuit evaluation function. The
correctness requirement states that, for all fˆ and all x ∈ {0, 1}fˆ .n, we have
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Pr[out1 = ev(fˆ , x)] = 1, where x = x1||x2, x1 ∈ I1 and (x2, fˆ) ∈ I2. We here
review the privacy of SFE in the honest-but-curious setting.
Definition 2. For a SFE scheme SF = (Σ, ev), a simulator S and an adversary
E, the security experiment relative to Φ is defined as follows:
EXPpri.sim,SSF,E,Φ (κ, i) : ExcuteSF(b, i, xi, fˆ) :
b
$← {0, 1}; if xi * {0, 1}fˆ .ni return ⊥;
b′ ← EExcuteSF(b,i,·,·)(κ, i); x3−i $← {0, 1}fˆ .n3−i , I1 := x1, I2 := (x2, fˆ);
if b = b′ return 1, if b = 1 return ViewiΣ(1
κ, I1, I2);
otherwise return 0. if i = 1 return S(1κ, ev(fˆ , x1||x2), Φ(fˆ));
if i = 2, return S(1κ, fˆ , |x1|);
We define the advantage of E, which is allowed only a single ExcuteSF query,
in the above experiment as: Advpri.sim,SSF,E,Φ (κ, i) :=
∣∣∣Pr[EXPpri.sim,SSF,E,Φ (κ, i) = 1]− 12 ∣∣∣ .
We say that SF is secure relative to Φ, if for each i ∈ {1, 2} and all PPT
adversaries E, the advantage Advpri.sim,SSF,E,Φ (κ, i) is a negligible function in κ.
3 A New Security Model for Privacy Preserving Indoor
Location Schemes
In this section, we define a new unilateral-malicious security model for privacy
preserving indoor location (PPIL) protocols which are based on Wifi fingerprints.
The privacy for client and server is formulated respectively following the well-
known game-based modeling approach [3, 10].
Simulation Preliminary. We first describe the general simulation environ-
ment which will be exploited in the following security notions (in particular for
security experiment). There are two types of entities considered: client C and
server S. The server S is supposed to provide the indoor location service (ILS)
of a building according to a client’s request. The building area (which is covered
by the location service) is assumed to be delicately divided into M reference
locations LT = {i, (xi, yi, zi)}Mi=1, e.g. the black dot in Figure 1, where (xi, yi)
denotes the horizontal coordinates and zi denotes the vertical coordinate (e.g.,
the position of a floor). One could consider the unit of each coordinate is meter
(m) for instance. Moreover, the building is deployed with N Wifi access points
(AP) to provide network service, where each i-th (i ∈ [N ]) access point may
have a unique identity APi. Let APT = {APj}Nj=1 be list storing all identities of
Wifi access points. In particular, each location has a so-called Wifi fingerprint
which comprises of Received Signal Strength (RSS) values of certain Wifi AP,
where each RSS value is from a range Rv = [vmin, vmax] and (vmin, vmax) are
minimum and maximum values respectively. Consequently, the server is assumed
to hold a pre-measured Wifi fingerprint database D which consists of a set of
tuples < i, Vi = {vi,j}Nj=1 >Mi=1 (See also in [22, Table 1]) , where i is an index
of a reference location Li ∈ LT, each vi,j denotes the RSS value obtained at
Li from APj . Furthermore, we let Dist be a distance function which takes as
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input two locations Li and Lj (with their corresponding coordinates (xi, yi, zi)
and (xj , yj , zj)) and outputs the distance between them. One could consider
Euclidean distance, i.e. equation 1, as a concrete example of Dist.
When C wants to know its location, it first measures the RSS values from
all APs to get a real-time Wifi fingerprint F = {fj}Nj=1. Then it may ‘privately’
submit F to S as a location query, and calculate its location L from S’s response.
We refer the reader to [23, §2.1] for more details on the principle of Wifi fin-
gerprint localization. Meanwhile, the private information of the client mainly
includes its secret key sk, location query F and the corresponding location L.
The secret of the server is the database D.
In order to emulate the behaviors of a set of entities (including λ clients
and 1 server), we may realize a collection of oracles {pisτ , pitλ+1 : τ ∈ [λ], s ∈
[d], t ∈ [λ × d]} for (λ, d) ∈ N. Each oracle pisτ behaves as the s-th protocol
instance (session) performed by the party τ for calculating one location. The
special party λ + 1 is assumed to be server. Each party may have a pair of
pubic/private key (pkτ , skτ ) for τ ∈ [λ + 1], where pkτ can be accessed by all
oracles. Moreover, each oracle pisτ for τ ∈ [λ] is supposed to keep the following
internal state variables: (i) dssτ ∈ {accept, reject} – final decision of a session; (ii)
F sτ – fingerprint F
s
τ = {v′j}Nj=1 for a location query; (iii) inssτ – index selection
set (INS) specifying the location indexes (in LT) which are close to the current
location related to F sτ ; (iv) er
s
τ – ephemeral randomness used to run the protocol
instance; (v) T sτ – transcript recording all sent and received protocol messages;
(vi) Lsτ = (x
s
τ , y
s
τ , z
s
τ ) – location of party τ calculated in the s-th session. We
assume the variable Lsτ will be assigned if and only if ds
s
τ = accept (meaning
that a protocol instance is correctly executed in a session). The server’s oracles
only have dssτ and T
s
τ .
In order to simulate a Wifi fingerprint used by a location query, we define a
function FPTSim(i) which on input a reference location index i generates a Wifi
fingerprint Fi = {fj}Nj=1 with the following steps: (i) fj $← [vi,j − ∆, vi,j + ∆]
where ∆ is a pre-defined positive integer, where vi,j ∈ D; (ii) If fj ≤ vmin or
vi,j = vmin then fj := vmin; (iii) Else if fj ≥ vmax then fj := vmax.
Adversarial Model. Here we define the power of an active adversaries. The
active adversaries A in our model are considered as a probabilistic polynomial
time (PPT) algorithms, which may interact with another PPT algorithm called
simulator C via the following queries:
– InitCorruptO(τ, s, F˜ ): The variables dssτ , T
s
τ and L
s
τ (if any) of the client’s
oracle pisτ are initiated with an empty string ∅. This query initializes inssτ :=
[M ]. If F˜ 6= ∅ and τ 6= λ + 1, this query sets F sτ := F˜ . Each oracle can be
initialized by this query only once.
– InitHonestO(τ, s, i, rds): This query first initializes dssτ , er
s
τ , T
s
τ and L
s
τ
with empty string ∅. Let i˜ns ⊆ [M ] be a set of location indexes such that
∀j ∈ i˜ns the distance between Li = (xi, yi, zi) and Lj = (xj , yj , zj) is smaller
than rds, i.e., Dist(Li, Lj) ≤ rds. Note that i˜ns may cover indexes within a
ball centered at i with radius rds. If τ 6= λ + 1 and #i˜ns ≥ dχ ·Me (for a
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threshold say 0.1 ≤ χ ≤ 1)1, this query initializes F sτ as follows: (i) j $← i˜ns;
(ii) F sτ := FPTSim(j); (iii) ins
s
τ := i˜ns. Again each client’s oracle can be
initialized by this query only once.
– ExecutePPIL(τ, s, t): This query executes the protocol instance between an
unused and initialized client’s oracle pisτ and a server’s unused oracle pi
t
λ+1,
and returns the protocol transcript T sτ . We call pi
s
τ and pi
t
λ+1 proceeded in this
query as partner oracles. The oracles run by this query are called used. All
server’s oracles here are assumed to be default initialized (without specific
initiation query).
– CorruptC(τ): This query responds with the τ -th client’s secret key skτ .
– CorruptS: This query responds with the server’s database D and secret key
skλ+1 (if any).
– RandReveal(τ, s): Oracle pisτ responds with the ephemeral secret key er
s
τ .
– LocReveal(τ, s): Oracle pisτ responds with the location L
s
τ .
– LocTest(τ, s): If the oracle has state dssτ 6= accept or τ = λ + 1, then this
query returns a failure symbol ⊥. Otherwise, it does the following steps:
(i) flip a fair coin b
$← {0, 1}; (ii) choose a random index j ∈ inssτ , obtain
Fj := FPTSim(j), and calculate L0 based on Fj and D (following the pro-
tocol specification) such that L0 6= Lsτ ; (iii) set L1 := Lsτ (which is the real
location). Eventually, the location Lb is returned. This query is allowed to be
asked at most once during the following corresponding security experiment.
We call the oracle pisτ selected in this query as test oracle.
– DBLeak(i): If the index i has been queried via this query, then it returns
a failure symbol ⊥. Otherwise, this query responses with a similar Wifi fin-
gerprint F ′i ← FPTSim(i) according to the i-th row of database D.
InitCorruptO query is used to model the chosen fingerprint attacks against
server’s privacy (in the unilateral-malicious setting), i.e., the malicious client may
choose special fingerprints (e.g. all zeros) to compromise the server’s database.
For example, the attack introduced in [22] is a kind of chosen fingerprint attack.
An oracle initialized by this query is known as location exposed oracle.
InitHonestO query is used to initialize the honest (unexposed) oracle based
on an area which is specified by an adversary in term of the reference location
index i and a radius rds. We categorize the attacks modeled by this query as
known sub-area attacks. Consider the attack scenario that an adversary loses
his tracking target at a street corner (determined by i) and he wants to know
the target’s ‘whereabouts’ (within a range rds). In this case, the attacker may
know an approximate area of the client within a range. Moreover, if rds is large
enough then it may cover all location indexes in LT.
ExecutePPIL query formulates the passive adversaries which only observe the
communication between the client and server.
CorruptC and CorruptS queries formulate the corruption of an honest
principal’s long-term credentials respectively. The corrupted party is known as
dishonest or malicious one.
1 If χ is too small, then there is no privacy at all.
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RandReveal query models the randomness exposure attacks which may be
caused by malware or careless disposal.
DBLeak query ‘approximately’ formulates the attack that A measures and
records the Wifi fingerprints Vi
′ (which is similar to Vi of D) for certain location
index i, say based on limited Wifi fingerprint samples.
LocReveal query models the known location attacks (ULA). The resilience
of ULA requires that the exposed locations will not affect the others. For ex-
ample, the PPIL scheme proposed in [12] is subject to known location attack.
To get a location, the client in [12] would issue a set of camouflaged localization
requests that follow a similar natural movement pattern. However, if one of the
client’s locations is exposed, e.g., by posting a picture, then the server can simply
identify which location request is the real one.
LocTest query will be exploited to formulate the capability of an adversary
on breaking the client’s privacy. The job of the adversary is to distinguish the
bit chosen by the LocTest query.
Note that we are the first one to generalize the practical attacks against
PPIL schemes via the above generic queries which have not been formalized in
previous work [13, 24, 22].
Client Privacy. We first define a security experiment as follows.
Security Experiment EXPCPΠ,A(κ,D): On input security parameter κ and a
server’s database D, the security experiment is carried out as a game between a
simulator C and an adversary A based on a PPIL scheme Π, where the following
steps are performed:
1. The simulator C first initiates the game by realizing a collection of oracles
and generating all public/private key pairs for all λ + 1 honest parties and
all other public information. C gives A all public information {pkτ}λ+1τ=1, LT,
APT and PD.
2. Amay adaptively issue a polynomial number of InitCorruptO, InitHonestO,
ExecutePPIL, CorruptC, CorruptS, LocReveal, and RandReveal queries.
At some point, A may issue a single LocTest(τ∗, s∗) query.
3. At the end of the game, A may terminate and output a bit b′ as its guess
for b of LocTest(τ∗, s∗) query.
4. Meanwhile, the experiment would return a failure symbol ⊥ if one of the
following conditions is satisfied: (a) A has not issued a LocTest(τ∗, s∗)
query; (b) The LocTest(τ∗, s) query returns a failure symbol ⊥; (c) A
asked an InitCorruptO(τ∗, s∗, F ∗) query to the test oracle; (d) A asked
a CorruptC(τ∗) query; (e) A asked either a RandReveal(τ∗, s∗) query or
a RandReveal(λ+ 1, t∗) query, where pit
∗
λ+1 is the partner oracle of the test
oracle; (f) A asked a LocReveal(τ∗, s∗) query to the test oracle pis∗τ∗ .
5. The experiment finally returns 1 if b = b′, and 0 otherwise.
We call an adversary as a ‘legal’ one if it runs an experiment without failure.
A legal adversary should not violate the rules defined in the above step 4). Note
that violating one of the rules c) to f) would ‘trivially’ break the client-privacy,
i.e., asking the corresponding queries (specified in the rules) would enable the
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adversary to easily distinguish the bit b chosen in the LocTest(τ∗, s) query
without breaking the underlying protocol. These situations should be therefore
forbidden in the experiment. Otherwise, it would always return 1.
Definition 3 (Client-privacy). The advantage of legal adversaries A in the
above experiment is AdvCPΠ,A(κ,D) :=
∣∣∣Pr[EXPCPΠ,A(κ,D) = 1]− 12 ∣∣∣ . We say that a
PPIL scheme Π is client-secure, if for all PPT legal adversaries A, the advantage
AdvCPΠ,A(κ,D) is a negligible function in κ.
Server Privacy. Informally speaking, the server’s privacy is achieved if all
polynomial time adversaries are unable to generate a database D′ which can
provide a similar function as the server’s real database D. We may call a location
calculated based on D′ as a fabricated location, and a location calculated based
on D as real location. Given two databases D and D′, we have the following
similar event (as exemplified in Figure 1):
– Similar Event (SE): For a client’s location query regarding Wifi fingerprint
Fi = {fj}Nj=1, the corresponding location Li and the fabricated location
L′i have distance at most ρ, i.e., Dist(Li, L
′
i) ≤ ρ, where ρ is a pre-defined
difference threshold (in meter).
L
L′
ρ L′′
Floor 3
Floor 1
Floor 2
L′′
L
L′
ρ
Fig. 1. Similar event occurrence examples in horizontal (left) and vertical planes
(right). The small black dots represent the reference locations in LT. The red dot represents the real
location L. The green dot represents the fabricated location L′ in which the similar event occurs.
The blue dot represents the fabricated location L′′ in which the similar event does not occur.
The term on ‘similar function’ of two databases can be roughly illustrated as
follows. Given a number of distinct client’s location queries, the occurrence rate
of SE is larger than a pre-defined success threshold α (e.g. α = 0.7). Let TF be
a test set that consists of |TF | > M distinct fingerprints of random locations.
For example, one could generate a fingerprint F ∈ TF by randomly choosing an
index i
$← [M ] and running F := FPTSim(i). Let SimilarTest be a function that
is used to test the functional similarity between two databases. SimilarTest takes
as input two databases D and D′ with their related reference location lists LT
and LT′ (respectively), and a test set TF , and outputs the test result in {0, 1}.
The execution steps of SimilarTest comprises of the following:
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Params Description
D real database of server
φ a security parameter specifying the number of DBLeak queries
ρ distance threshold between the real location and the
fabricated location
α probability threshold of SE
TF test set of random fingerprints
Table 1. Parameters of server-privacy.
– Initiate a SE count variable cnt := 0. Suppose that for a fingerprint Fi ∈ TF
the real location which is calculated based on Fi, D and LT is Li = (xi, yi, zi),
and the fabricated location which is calculated based on Fi, D
′ and LT′ is
L′i = (x
′
i, y
′
i, z
′
i). For i ∈ [|TF |], if Dist(Li, L′i) ≤ ρ then cnt := cnt+ 1.
– Finally, it returns 1 if cnt|TF | > α; otherwise, 0 is returned.
The parameters, which are relevant to the formulation of the server-privacy,
are summarized in Table 1.
Security Experiment EXPSPΠ,A(κ,D, LT, ρ, α, φ): On input security parameter
κ, a server’s database D, and a distance accuracy threshold ρ, the security ex-
periment is carried out as a game between a simulator C and an adversary A
based on a PPIL scheme Π, where the following steps are performed:
1. The simulator C first implements a collection of oracles and generates all
public/private key pairs for all λ + 1 honest parties and all other public
information. All public information are given to A.
2. A may issue a polynomial number of queries to InitCorruptO, CorruptC,
ExecutePPIL, RandReveal, and LocReveal respectively, and at most φ
DBLeak queries.
3. Eventually, A may return a database D′ and a relevant reference location
list LT′ that has M ′ reference location. Meanwhile, the experiment would
return a failure symbol ⊥ if A asked either a RandReveal(λ + 1, ·) query
or more than φ queries to DBLeak.
4. Finally, the experiment returns SimilarTest(D,D′, LT, LT′, TF ).
Definition 4 (Server-privacy). The advantage of a legal adversary A in the
above experiment is AdvSPΠ,A(κ,D, LT, ρ, α, φ) := Pr[EXP
SP
Π,A(κ,D, LT, ρ, α, φ) =
1]. We say that a PPIL scheme Π is server-secure, if for all PPT legal adver-
saries A, the advantage AdvSPΠ,A(κ,D, LT, ρ, α, φ) is a negligible function in κ.
We define the above model based on Wifi fingerprint database as an example.
Of course, one could simply modify our model for other types of PPIL schemes
since each query aforementioned represents a generic class of attacks against
PPIL schemes. One may only need to customize the simulation environment
and slightly modify the queries if necessary.
Database Hardcore. The volume of a database D is determined by the
number M of reference locations (that is related to the area of a building), the
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number N of APs, and bit size of each RSS value |Rv|. However, there is a
general problem on how hard it is for adversaries to generate a valid fabricated
database D′ without any useful information from a PPIL scheme using D. I.e. is
the D′ itself hard to build? This question is independent of any concrete PPIL
schemes. If D′ is easy to generate without breaking the PPIL scheme, then we do
not need a PPIL scheme at all. Since the server could just publish its database
for all clients. Intuitively, the adversary should be very hard to generate a valid
fabricated D′ that has a similar function as D since D′ also has a large number of
bits to predict. In the following, we are going to give a formal definition regarding
the security assumption of a database (that is non-relevant to PPIL schemes).
Definition 5. The security experiment for testing the hardness of forging a sim-
ilar database for a target database D is defined in the following:
EXPDBHD (κ,D, LT, ρ, α, φ) :
(D′, LT′)← DDBLeak(·)(LT, ρ, α, φ), Return SimilarTest(D,D′, LT, LT′, ρ, α, φ).
The advantage of D which can ask at most φ DBLeak queries in the above
experiment is AdvDBHD (κ,D, LT, ρ, α, φ) := Pr[EXP
DBH
D (κ,D, LT, ρ, α, φ) = 1]. We
say that a database D is hard to forge, if for all PPT adversaries D the advantage
AdvDBHD (κ,D, LT, ρ, α, φ) is a negligible function in κ.
It is straightforward to see that D is hard to forge if only a small portion of
D is leaked via DBLeak to the adversary and D has large M , N , and |Rv|, e.g.,
M = 505, N = 241 and |Rv| = 8 in the real database [16, BUILDING1 NEW]
which has M ×N × |Rv| = 973640 bits at all. However, an open question is how
hard it is to create a valid fabricated database. Such hardness might be closely
related to the structure of specific building and database generation algorithm.
In the future work, one is encouraged to formally analyze the database hardcore
assumption in the setting with the leakage of side-channel information, such as
adversaries’ own RSS measurements modeled by DBLeak query.In this paper,
we just focus on the formalism of server-privacy for PPIL schemes.
4 On the Security of the YJ Scheme
The YJ Scheme. We first review the PPIL scheme [22] recently proposed by
Yang and Ja¨rvinen. The YJ scheme is built from Paillier PKE Pai = (KeyGen,
Enc,Dec) and two-party SFE protocol SF = (Σ, ev). Paillier PKE scheme is used
to protect a client C’s fingerprint F = (f1, f2, . . . , fN ). In the YJ scheme, the
server S should compute the distances between F and Vi (of its database D),
where each distance di is assumed to be the following Euclidean distance:
di = ||Vi − F ||2 =
N∑
j=1
(vi,j − fj)2 =
N∑
j=1
v2i,j +
N∑
j=1
(−2vi,jfj) +
N∑
j=1
f2j . (1)
SFE protocol is used to privately compute the location LC = (x, y, z) of C as
the centroid of the k nearest reference locations indexed by i1, i2, . . . , ik, where
14 Z.Yang et al.
i1, i2, . . . , ik indicate distances such that di1 ≤ di2 ≤ . . . ≤ dik ≤ dj for all
j 6= i1, i2, . . . , ik.
Protocol Description. When C subscribes to the location service, it runs
(sk, pk)
$← KeyGen(κ) to generate a key pair (sk, pk) for Paillier PKE scheme
with a sufficiently large κ (e.g. κ = 2048) and sends pk = (n, g) to S. The
protocol execution is shown in Figure 2.
Note that the randomness space RR = Zn may result in the blinded dis-
tance being wraparound over Zn, i.e. a modular n operation is involved in the
generation of the blinded distance.
C
(sk, pk)
$← KeyGen(1κ)
S
Database D
Location Retrieval with F = (f1, f2, . . . , fN )
For j ∈ [N ]: For i ∈ [M ]:
Cj,0 := Enc(pk,−2fj) C∆i,1 := Enc(pk,
∑N
j=1 v
2
i,j)
C1 := Enc(pk,
∑N
j=1 f
2
j ) C∆i,2 :=
∏N
j=1 C
vi,j
j,0
Cdi := C∆i,1 · C∆i,2 · C1
−
{{Cj,0}Nj=1, C1}, pk−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(θ, {CRcb,ι}θι=1, {Rι}θι=1)
← Algorithm 1({Cdi}Mi=1,M)
←−−−
{CRcb,ι}θι=1−−−−−−−−−−−−−
For ι ∈ [θ]:
dι := Dec(sk, CRcb,ι) Produce fˆ
I1 = x1 := {dι}θι=1 x2 := {Rι}θι=1, I2 ← (fˆ , x2)
←−−−
SF.Σ(I1, I2)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Obtain SF.ev(fˆ , x1||x2)
Fig. 2. The YJ Scheme
Security Analysis. The security results of our scheme are shown by the fol-
lowing theorems. Here we briefly analyze the theorems. The full proofs of them
will be presented in the full version of this paper.
Theorem 1. Suppose that the Paillier PKE scheme Pai is secure and the SFE
scheme SF is secure, then the YJ scheme with a database D is client-secure with
AdvCPYJ,A(κ,D) ≤ (dλ) · ((N + 1) · Advind-cpaPai,B (κ) + M2 · Advpri.indSF,E,Φ(κ, 1)).
We summarize the games of the proof in Table 2. We use a superscript ‘∗’ to
denote an element of the test oracle.
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Algorithm 1: Pack Encrypted Distance Set
Input: {Cdi}Mi=1 and M
Output: θ, {CRcb,ι}θι=1, and {Rι}θι=1
1 θ := 1; µ := M ; RR = Zn
2 while µ > 0 do
3 t := κ−1
m
4 if t > µ then
5 t := µ
6 Ccb,θ :=
∏t
i=1 C
2(i−1)m
dµ−i ; Rθ
$←RR; CRcb,θ := Ccb,θ · Enc(pk,Rθ)
7 µ := µ− t
8 if µ 6= 0 then
9 θ := θ + 1
10 return (θ, {CRcb,ι}θι=1, {Rι}θι=1)
Game Description & Modification
0 Real experiment. {{C∗j,0}Nj=1, C∗1} and {C∗Rcb,ι}θι=1 of the test oracle
are computed with F ∗ = {f∗ι }Nι=1 $← FPTSim(i∗).
1 Abort if the challenger fails to guess the test oracle.
2 {C∗ι,0}Nι=1 are computed with F ∗′ = {f∗ι ′}Nι=1, but {C∗Rcb,ι, C∗1}θι=1 are
computed with F ∗ = {f∗ι }Nι=1, where f∗1 ′ 6= f∗1 but {f∗ι ′}Nι=2 = {f∗ι }Nι=2.
3.j Game 2= Game 3.1
j ∈ [N ] In Game 3.j: f∗ι ′ 6= f∗ι for 1 ≤ ι ≤ j, but {f∗ι ′}Nι=j+1 = {f∗ι }Nι=j+1.
4 Generating C∗1 using a random squared RSS values.
∀{{C∗j,0}Nj=1, C∗1} and {C∗Rcb,ι}θι=1 are independent now.
5 A random location is chosen to answer the LocTest query
Table 2. Sequence of games for client-privacy.
Theorem 2. Suppose that the SFE scheme SF is secure, the database D is hard
to forge, then the YJ scheme is server secure with AdvSPYJ,A(κ,D, LT, ρ, α, φ) ≤
d · ` · Advpri.indSF,E,Φ(κ, 2) + θ·d·`2κ + AdvDBHD (κ,D, LT, ρ, α, φ).
We summarize the proof of this theorem in Table 3.
Game Description & Modification
0 Real experiment.
1 Abort if two random values are equal.
2 The random values used to generate the ciphertexts {C∗Rcb,ι}θι=1 and
corresponding SFE protocol instance are different.
3 Apply database entropy assumption as Definition 5.
Table 3. Sequence of games for server-privacy.
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5 Conclusion
We presented the first formal privacy model for Wifi fingerprint based PPIL
schemes, where both client- and server- privacy are formulated in a unilateral-
malicious setting to cover state-of-the-art active attacks. The client-privacy is
defined based on the classic notion of indistinguishability, and the server privacy
is defined in a computational manner. The proposed model is verified by ap-
plying it for proving a recent PPIL protocol. An interesting open question here
is whether or nor our security analysis approach can be applied to prove other
kinds of privacy-preserving schemes which have a similar construction (i.e., using
Paillier PKE and SFE) to the YJ scheme, e.g., the protocols for face recognition
[19, 4]. For theoretical interesting, the reader is encouraged to define a stronger
security model in the full malicious setting based on our model, and to proposed
PPIL protocols which can be proven secure under such model. For example, one
could allow the active adversaries to send her own messages to oracles (mas-
querading as either client or server). In the future work, it is also required to
formally study the complexity of Definition 5. Nevertheless, it might be also
interesting to consider whether or not it is possible to model the server-privacy
based on indistinguishability.
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